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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is a study of the proposed Volta River po-
wer and aluminum project in Ghana with special reference to 
the problem of central economic planning in underdeveloped 
areas. The issue of central planning arises from the attempts 
of public or quasi-public agencies to allocate factors of 
production without recourse to the price mechanism of the 
competitive market. A centrally planned economy is charac-
terized by public control of all factors of production ex-
cept labor and by t h e elimination of profits. 
A striking feature of the economic structures of under-
developed countries, such as Ghana, is the low level of ca-
pital. This situation complicates planning in these coun-
tries, because public projects are typically undertaken on 
a large scale involving great expenditures of capital funds. 
The complication is therefore due to the necessity of having 
to raise funds in foreign capital markets. 
If the foreign capital is made available, in whole or 
in part, in the form of loans- whether by private or public 
agencies, it is reasonable to assume that these f unds would 
be suf ficient only for specific, potentially profitable 
ventures without regard to the objectives of the planning 
agency. It follows that foreign investors would calculate 
profitability by using the only objective standard of mea-
ii 
surement- the price system. These two problems- the limited 
range of investment opportunities and the criterion of and 
method o~ calculating prof its- imply that planning bodies 
in underdeveloped areas would find it increasingly difficult 
to execute their schemes, because these agencies do not con-
trol all factors of production (except labor), and are 
forced to rely on the very principles which the agencies were 
established to avoid. 
The Volta River Project is an example of a planned un-
dertaking by both public and private investors. On the one 
hand, the Ghana Government viewed the scheme as a means of 
diversifying the country's economy in order to reduce Ghana's 
dependence on one export commodity- cocoa, which is subject 
to wide price fluctuations; on the other hand, the aluminum 
companies and the United Kingdom Government, who participa-
ted in the planning of the scheme, were motivated by anti-
cipated profits and a new source of aluminum supply, and 
were influenced by the market conditions f or the metal. 
To approach the subject by an analysis of all aspects 
of the scheme could result in obscuring the basic issues of 
central planning in a mass of minute detail without adding 
signi f icantly to the results of the investigation. Two care-
fully considered aspects of the project have been selected 
for analysis: (1) the consequences of the dam and reservoir 
(which would be constructed as part of t he power station) 
iii 
on the economy of the areas · subject to flooding, and (2) 
the relationship of the project to the alQminum market. 
These two aspects are significant, because they permit 
a study of the relationship of the scheme to other sectors 
·or the economy of Ghana- whichiin theory, could come under 
the control of a central planning body, and to the alQminu.>n 
market- which lies beyond the control of any agency in Ghana. 
The discussion is preceded by a brier historical review of 
the project, as a means of facilitating appreciation of the 
principles and methods of planning underlying the scheme. 
1. 
CHAPTER ONE: THE HISTORY OF THE VOLTA RIVER PROJECT 
The possibility of producing aluminQm in ~hana is not 
a recent development of the post World 1-/ar II period. HI th 
the discovery in 1914 of an estimated two hundred t-v;enty-
five million tons of bauxite,1 the essential raw material 
from which aluminum is fabricated, consideration had been 
given to the possibilities of its production at various 
times even before World War II by both the. Gold Coast (now 
Ghana) Government and private aluminum interests. 
In 1924, proposals for the construction of a hydro-
electric power station at Ajena in the Akwapim Hills were 
f ormulated and examined by the Gold Coast Government. 2 Be-
cause t he territory lacked heavy industry which could have 
utilized the power produced, the Government abandoned the 
plans as being uneconomic.3 Attention in the project vras 
revived in 1938, when Mr. Duncan Rose obtained concessions 
from the Government with respect to aluminum production and 
began a detailed investigation of the potentialities for 
aluminum production in the country. Although the war forced 
him to abandon his study in 1939, the investigations were 
resumed in 1945 under the sponsorship of West African Alu-
minium Limited, a newly organized corporation whose chair-
1. R.B. Davison, "The Volta River Aluminum Schemen, Poli-
tical Quarterly, XXV, p. 56. 
2. CMD. 8702: Volta River Aluminium Scheme {London, H.M.S.~ 
!95"2) :-P. 13. 
3. Ibid., p. 2. 
1 man was Mr. Rose. 
2. 
Aluminium Limited of Canada acquired a share of the 
ownership of the l~est African aluminum company in 1949, and, 
in collaboration with the British Aluminium Company, reviewed 
in 1950 the results of the investigations that had been 
made previously. In their joint report of 1951, the Cana-
dian and British companies concluded that the investiga-
tions represented" ••• a sound engineering proposition and 
could produce aluminum at an economic cost."2 
In the meantime, the Gold Coast Government desired a 
more detailed survey of the territory's potential before 
granting any additional concessions other than those already 
made to Mr. Rose.3 Sir William Halcrow and Partners, a Bri-
tish engineering firm, were commissioned in 1949 to under-
take this survey which included an investigation not only 
of the proposed power station, but also of the affects of 
the scheme on the irrigation and drainage of the Volta Ri-
ver Basin and the requirements of river navigation and pub-
lic works.4 In its preliminary and final reports, submitted 
in 1950 and 1951, respectively, the firm set forth a power 
and altnnintnn-producing project which laid the foundation 
for further discussions between the aluminum companies and 
the Governments of the Gold Coast and the United Kingdom; 
1. Ibid., p. 13. 
2. I'5Ia., p. 13. 
3. Ibid.' p. 13. 4. Ibid.' p. 13. 
3. 
representatives of the engineering firm and of Cooper Bro-
thers and Company, the accountants engaged by the United 
Kingdom as advisers on the financial aspects of the project, 
participated in these discussions also. 
These conferences, which took place in Longon and Ac-
cra, had as their objective the exploration of the condi-
tions under which the participants might enter the project, 
inasmuch as they were all unwilling to commit themselves at 
that time. 1 A proposed scheme for the development of the 
Volta River Basin, which is embodied in the 1952 White Pa-
per on the subject (C}ID. 8702), and an agreement between 
the two governments calling for the establishment of the 
Volta River Preparatory Commission were the results of the 
discussions. 
I. The Volta River Project as envisaged in 1952. 2 
The Volta River Project would consist of essentially 
three sections: (1) a hydro-electric power station at Ajena, 
(2) an aluminum smelter at Kpong, and (3) the public works 
required f or the f irst two components of the scheme. In ad-
dition, the tVhite Paper set f orth the methods of financing 
the project and the institutional framework which would be 
established to undertake the construction and operation of 
the scheme. 
1. Ibid., p. 13. 
2. The ensuing discussion of the Volta River Project is 
summarized from. the 1952 White Paper. 
{i) The hydro-electric power station. 
The power station would be erected at Ajena which is 
located approximately seventy miles from the mouth of the 
Volta River in the Akwapim Hills. The components of the 
station would include a dam, a lake two thousand square 
miles in extent, the electricity-generating plant, and 
transmission lines. 
In the initial stage (corresponding to the capacity 
required for the production of eighty thousand tons of alu-
minum), t h e cost was estimated at forty-five and one-half 
million pounds, of which the United Kingdom would provide 
thirty-seven and one-half million pounds and the Gold Coast 
at least eight million pounds. In the remaining two stages 
( corresponding to one hundred twenty thousand and two hun-
dred ten thousand tons of aluminum, respectively), the Uni-
ted Kingdom's share would increase first by four million 
pounds and, finally, by an additional four and one-half 
million pounds; the financial responsibility of the Gold 
Coast would not be enlarged however. The total cost of the 
power station at its full generating capacity {five hundred 
sixty-four thousand kilowatts per annum) would amount to an 
estimated fifty-four million pounds. 
The work on the power station would be advanced in such 
fashion as to make power available five to seven years after 
construction had begun. The 1952 scheme provided, also, t hat 
5. 
only a small proportion of the electricity generated would 
be made available to consumers other than the smelter which 
would be given the highest priority in allocating the power 
produced. 
(ii) The aluminum smelter. 
The aluminum smelter would be situated approximately 
twelve- miles southwest of Ajena in the vicinity of Kpong. 
In addition to the aluminum plant, this aspect of the scheme 
would also involve t h e construction of a township. The smel-
ter's initial planned capacity would be eighty thousand 
tons of aluminum; the capacity would be expanded in time, 
first, to one hundred twenty thousand tons, and, ultimately, 
to two hundred ten thousand tons per annum. Bauxite would 
be supplied from the deposits at Mpraeso and Yenahin; these 
deposits contain an estimated two hundred million tons of 
ore, which, it was thought, would be sufficient for the 
smelter to operate at full capacity for about two hundred 
years. 
The initial cost of constructing the smelter was esti-
mated at t wenty-nine million pounds, and sixty-four million 
pounds at its full capacity. The United Kingdom would pro-
vide one-fifth of t he initial capital and, if requested, up 
to one-half the cost of expanding the smelter's capacity to 
one hundred twenty thousand tons; the total financial bur-
den falling upon the United Kingdom would therefore be ten 
million eight hundred thousand pounds, of which five million 
6. 
eight hundred thousand would be its initial obligation. 
Most of the capital would be made available by the aluminum 
interests; their total share would amount to from forty-
two million six hundred thousand pounds to forty-seven mil-
lion nine hundred thousand pounds. Their initial investment 
would be twenty million nine hundred thousand pounds, fol-
lowed by an additional four and one-half million pounds in 
the intermediate stage, and the balance in the final stage 
of expansion. The investment of the Government and citizens 
of t h e Gold Coast would rang e from five million t hree hun-
dred thousand pounds to ten million six hundred thousand 
pounds , of which two million three hundred thousand pounds 
would be forthcoming in the first phase, and followed by an 
additional one-half million pounds in the intermediate 
phase of constru ction. The complex na ture of the arrange-
ments f or financing this phase of the project is deferred 
until the discussion of the institutional framework of the 
scheme. 
(iii) Public works. 
The 1952 scheme required that the Gold Coast Gover n-
ment install an extensive system of public works at an es-
timated cost of t wenty-six million pounds; neither the Uni-
ted Kingdom nor the aluminum companies would share in the 
financing of these works. This aspect of the project would 
include a new port at Tema (in addition to the present faci-
lities at Sekondi-Takoradi), new roads and railways, town-
7. 
ships and housing for labor at both Ajena and Kpong, and 
schools and other social amenities. 
Of the total planned expenditure, eleven million pounds 
were allocated for the installation of the port and town-
ship facilities at Tema, which the Gold Coast Government 
had already decided to erect irrespective of the final de-
cision on the project. Two railroad lines would be construe-
ted to connect the bauxite deposits at Yenahin with the 
smelter at Kpong; additional lines would link Tema and Ac-
cra and Tema and Kpong. 
(iv) The institutional framework. 
The institutional arrangements embodying the components 
of the scheme are threefold: (1) the Volta River Authority, 
(2) the Volta Electricity Board, and (3) the Smelter Com-
pany. These three bodies would assume the responsibilities 
of constructing and operating the project. 
(1) The Volta River Authority. 
The coordination of the planning and construction of 
the scheme would be undertaken by a public authority, the 
Volta River Authority. Its functions would include the 
building of (1) the power station, (2) the smelter, (3) the 
port and transportation .facilities, and (4) the towns at 
the power station and the smelter. The Authority would be 
established by legislation in the Gold Coast, and its chair-
man would be appointed by the Gold Coast Government in con-
8. 
sultation with the United Kingdom, but only as long as the 
financial arrangements with the latter 1-1ere still in force. 
Representatives of the Gold Coast, the United Kingdom, and 
the alumin~m companies would constitute the membership of 
the Authority. 
The Authority's funds would be supplied by the two Go-
vernments and the aluminum companies; the funds would take 
t he form of loans to the Authority, the assets of which 
serving as collateral. The Authority's income would be de-
rived from the sale of power, and would be used to pay the 
interest and principal of the loans over a period of eighty 
years. The Authority would therefore have the incentive to 
see to the proper allocation of its resources among their 
several uses; moreover, the Authority would have to bear in 
mind the fact that the original funds would be earmarked for 
specific aspects of the scheme. 
The interest rate, being a major cost of the project, 
would be determined in accordance with the wishes of the 
alumin~~ com08nies. Two methods of reckoning the rate were 
proposed: (1) the rate could be made to reflect changes in 
the money market by determining it separately for each in-
stallment of the loan, or (2) a fixed charge could be set 
at the outset of the construction phase. The aluminu~ com-
panies had indicated that they did not prefer to enter up on 
a long term investment at a time Hhen high rates were pre-
9. 
vailing , lest they be unable to conver t to a more f avorable 
basis in the f uture. 
The principal areas of coordination by the Author ity 
would be, f irst, t h e several components of the project and, 
secondly, the integration of t he project with the separate 
development prog r ams of the Gold Coast Government. As for 
t h e former, the Authority would construct the power station, 
and would supervise the construction of the smelter, the 
development of t h e mines, and the installation of t h e trans-
portation and harbor facilities to be undertaken by t h e Gold 
Coast Railways Department, Public Works Department, and the 
Tema Development Co r poration. 
The second area of coordination would probably be the 
more difficult due to t h e requirements of similar factors 
of production f or both t he scheme and the separate develop-
ment programs of t h e Gold Coast Government. In t he event of 
a conflict between the two, the Authority would be able to 
approach and could expect assistance f rom the Prime Minis ~ 
ter. The magnitude of the project and of the financial bur-
den would presuppose t he smooth functioning of all agencies 
engaged in the construction phase; the Gold Coast Govern-
ment t heref ore agreed to postpone any aspects of its deve-
lopment plans which would be competing with the project for 
scarce factors. 
(2) The Volta Electricity Board. 
10. 
The Volta Electricity Board would be constituted as an 
autonomous agency with a full-time chairman and a membership 
selected in the same manner as the Authority. It would re-
place the Authority once construction had been completed 
and power was available. The Board would assume all of the 
Authority's responsibilities, sell electric power, and as-
sume the obligation to increase the capacity of and the 
maintainance of the power station. 
(3) The Smelter Company. 
The construction and operation of the smelter and 
mines would be in the hands of a private corporate body, the 
Smelter Company. With the exception of the United Kingdom's 
share of the cost, all investment would take the form of 
equity. Initially, the Gold Coast would be alloted ten per 
cent of the stock; the Government would be acting as trus-
tee .for the people of the country. After tv.renty-.five years 
of operation, the Gold Coast would have the opportunity of 
offering for sale to private citizens an amount of equity e-
qual to the amount previously transferred to private in-
vestors from the Govennment's holdings. The important fact 
' -
is that the population would have a share in the profits of 
the Smelter Company- either individually or collectively. A 
second significant aspect of the financial arrangements is 
that Aluminium Limited would have to raise one-half of its 
share in Canada, and could increase its holdings only by 
11. 
selling its own stock in the Sterling Area or by floating 
a bond issue in the Sterling Area; the significance of these 
arrangements lies in the fact that Aluminium Limited would 
be supplying dollars as interest payments to the United 
Kingdom. 
The smelter and the township would be constructed on 
land leased from the Gold Coast Government which, in turn, 
would be responsible for acquiring the la:md from private 
citizens. The lease would run for eighty years plus an ad-
ditional period of up to three years to compensate f or the 
fact t hat the Company would realize no income during the 
construction period. 
II. Attitudes of the participants in the project. 
(i) The position of the United Kingdom. 
United Kingdom colonial policy after World War II was 
characterized by intensive economic and social development 
plans for the colonial territories as reflected in such le-
gislation as the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts and 
the Colonial Development Corporation. The United Kingdom 
recognized, however, that it had scarce resour'ces whf:ch 
could be made available to its many dependencies, and t h ere-
fore had to require that the territories contribute part of 
the funds for the execution of their development programs.l 
1. I.D. 892 (Revised)-: The United Kingdom Colonial Develop-
ment and Welfare Acts-TLondon, British Information Ser-
vices-;-1955), pp. 3-7. 
12. 
Ul'HTED KINGDO:r-1: ALUHINUH CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTIONl 
( '000 long tons) 
Year 
1m" 
1924 
1926 
1928 
1930 
1932 
1934 
1936 
1938 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
Consum;tion Production(a) 
17 7 
19 7 
17 11 
24 14 
20 10 
23 13 
38 16 
45 23 
135 19 
166 23 
259 47 
293 57 (1) 
252 37 (20 
150 33 (2) 
201 34 (3) 
267 31 (3) 
243 33 (3) 
247 34 (4) 
268 33 (4) 
316 31 ( ) 
e f gures in parentheses indi-
cate the amount produced in the 
Sterling Area- but not in the 
United Kingdom.-- - - -
British interest in the Volta scheme cannot however be 
attributed to mere altruism; the 1952 \Vh.ite Paper wa.s ex-
plicit in noting that the United Kingdom favored the prin-
ciple of the project both as a means of developing colonial 
resources and "••• as contributing to the raw material 
needs of the United Kingdom." 2 The above table which is 
constructed from data concerning aluminUm consumption in 
the United Kingdom and total production of the Sterling 
Area illustrates a situation in which aluminum demand ex-
1. GMD. 8702, pp. 8 f. 
2. Ibid., p. 6. 
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ceeded its supply. Domestic demand outran supply from the 
year 1922, and Canada (in the Dollar Area) supplied the 
difference for the most part •1 The grea.t increase in con-
sumption during the war and post-war years was partly be-
cause of the increased production of armaments and the de-
velopment of new uses for the metal after the war; demand 
for aluminUm. was such as to necessitate the imposition of 
state controls on consumption. 2 It is noteworthy that pro-
duction in the United Kingdom declined after 1943, and that 
the Sterling Area as a whole was maintaining a level of out-
put of about thirty-three thousand tons per annum. The de-
cline in United Kingdom production is partly because of the 
post~war dismantling of hydro-electric power stations in 
Scotland.3 One writer reported ·in 1954 that no expansion of 
the domestic industry was planned in the United Klngdom,4 
although consumption was expected to exceed one million 
tons by 197S.S 
The United Kingdom was left, therefore, to choose be-
tween either continuing to lean heavily upon Canada for its 
aluminum, or developing the resources of the empire. The 
United Kingdom's dollar deficit led to the selection of the 
second alternative, and investigations were made of the po-
l. Ibid., p. 12. 
2. Ibid., pp. 8 f. 
3. Ibid., p. 11. 
4. L.H. Tarring, "Increasing Importance of Bauxite as a 
Dollar Earner", Times British Colonies Review (No. 16, 
1954) ~ p. 9. 
5. CHD. t5702, p. 11. 
14. 
tential of North Borneo and of the Gold Coast.1 The pres-
sure brought to bear upon the United Kingdom by the dollar 
gap is also reflected in the arrangements regarding the 
share of equity in the Smelter Company which would be owned 
by Aluminium Limited. In addition, to secure the Gold Coast 
as a source of supply, the White Paper provided that seven-
ty-five per cent of the aluminum produced would be reserved 
for fabricators in the United Kingdom. 2 
The scarcity of resources for colonial development is 
reflected in the caution of the United Kingdom in financing 
the project. In all cases involving United Kingdom invest-
ment, funds are made available in the form of interest-
bearing loans on the assets of the profitable aspects of 
the scheme.3 It must be noted, of course, that the magni-
tude of the estimated eosts of the project was a factor 
causing all the participants to move with caution. 
(ii) The alQminum companies. 
There is no question but that the aluminum companies 
considered the project from the viewpoint of profits and 
the possible extension of their markets for factors of pro-
duction. Like the United Kingdom, the companies would in-
vest only in the profitable components of the scheme. 
The aluminum interests were also concerned with go-
1. Ibid., p. 12. 
2. Ibid., p. 6. 
3. R.B. Davison, p. 61. 
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vernmental participation in the project; their position was 
summed up in the 1952 White Paper as follows: nThe alu..rn.inu.m 
companies attach importance to private enterprise •••• "1 It 
is therefore significant that the Smelter Company would be 
under private management, that the aluminum companies would 
own ninety per cent of the equity capital, that the increase 
in the amount of stock to be held by the Gold Coast Govern-
ment would depend on the extent to which private citizens 
would acquire stock from the Government in the first twenty-
five years of the smelter's operation, and that the Volta 
Electricity Board, which would supply the smelter's power 
requirements, would be an autonomous agency. 
(iii) The Gold Coast Government. 
While the Volta River Project might be a source of 
revenue to the Government, such a motivation ranked third 
to the greater objectives of diversifying the economy, 
which was dependent upon one commodity- cocoa, and of pro-
moting a higher standard of living for the population. 
This objective of a higher standard of living was tied to 
the more pressing goal of national independence; the poli-
tical leaders of the country acted with caution, lest the 
scheme, with its large foreign capital investment, should 
become the reinforcing agent of imperialism. 
Seers and Ross labelled the Gold Coast's economy as 
1 • C!ID • 8 7 02 , p • 15 • 
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"The Fragile Economy'' because of its reliance upon one ex-
port crop- cocoa. 1 The Gold Coast Economic Survey of 1952 
reported that cocoa comprised two-thirds of its exports; 
the survey ~rankly observed that other sectors of the eco-
nomy (including government) were influenced by the pros-
perity of the cocoa industry. 2 The cocoa farmers were con-
tinually faced with prospects of uncertain incomes owing to 
price fluctuations in the cocoa market: farmers received 
eighty shillings per sixty pound load in 1951;3 the price 
fell to seventy shillings in 1952;4 and, in 1955, seventy-
t wo shillings were paid for the main crop and eighty shil-
lings for the mid-crop.5 
Another problem which faced the economy was inadequate 
port and transportation f acilities. The port at Takoradi 
handled sixty-eight per cent of all imports and ninety-five 
per cent of all exports in 1952 and sixty-two per cent of 
all imports and ninety-four per cent of all exports in 1953. 
Although these figures may seem impressive, a glance at t he 
physical quantities handled reveals that the port was mo-
ving twice the tonnage for which it was originally inten-
1. D. Seers and C.R. Ross, Report on Financial and Ph~sical 
Problems of Development in the Gold Coast (Accra,overn-
ment Statistician, 1952)-,-c~:---
2. Gold Coast Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 1952 
(Accra, Government Statistician, 1953), p. lS. ----
3. Ibid., p. 15. 4. Ibid., p. 15. 
5. Economic Survey 1955, p. 25. 
17. 
ded to handle. 1 Similarly, the railroads were inadequate; 
from 1949 to 1954, no significant increases in tonnage car-
ried were noticeable, although production of timber, cocoa, 
and minerals had in fact increased. The Ministry of Finance 
gave the fact that the railways were required to carry in-
creasing amounts of imports and domestically produced goods 
as its explanation for this situation. 2 Road transportation 
was a deterrent to economic activity also; only eight thou-
sand one hundred miles of public roads were in operation in 
1953, but heavier traffic and poor maintenance during World 
War II rendered them less effective than had they be en ade-
quate in proportion to the amount and type of traffic;· which 
they were called upon to handilie.3 The communications network 
was, therefore, neither extensive enough nor equiped suf-
ficiently to carry the increasing amounts of imports; the 
result was that distributive problems arose in connection 
with trade- e.g •. , the United Africa Company was r eported 
to have estimated a year's lag between the placement of 
orders and the delivery of commodities.4 
FUrthermore, the t .ypes of goods imported impeded pro-
gress on development plans. The quantities and value of 
cons~~er goods imported increased markedly in the post-war 
period, although capital goods imported into the country 
1. Economic Survey 1953, p. 
2. Economic Survez ~' p. 
3. Economic Survey ~B p. 
4. Seers and Ross, p. 1 • 
36. 42. 
32. 
18. 
did not show so great an increase.1 The attempt to ease the 
difficulties in communications and other areas of develop-
ment was thwarted, therefore,. by the added pressure on 
existing facilities. 
This pressure and the system of trading give rise to 
a high price level in the country. Although the street tra-
ders perform the valuable service of distributing commodi-
ties in manageable quantities, that t hey deal with innumer-
able middlemen causes prices to increase. 2 As a consequence, 
domestic savings are kept at a low level; capital formation 
is retarded, and the opportunities for occupational mobility 
are diminished. Household surveys in three villages confirm 
this statement regarding savings;3 that occupational mobi-
lity is impeded implies that food and cocoa farming, which 
Professor Lewis has described as stagnant and declining,4 
would continue to dominate the country's economic activity. 
This discussion has relevance for Ghana's development 
programs (including the Volta scheme) in terms of priori-
ties and of capital formation. The inadequacy of communica-
1. Gold Coast Ministry of Trade and Labour, Handbook of 
Trade and Commerce (Accra, The Ministry, 1955), p.~6. 
2. Seers and Ross, p. 16. 
3. See the following surveys published by the Gold Coast 
Government Sta tistician: 
1. 1954 Akuse Survey of Household Budgets, 1955. 
2. Kumasi Survey of Population and Household 
Budgets 1955, 1956. -
3. Sekondi-TakOradi Survey of Population and House-
hold Budgets, 1956. -- ---
4. W.A. Lewis, Report on Industrialization in the Gold Coast , 
{Accra, Government Printer, 1953), pp. 2:f.-------
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tions facilities requires a decision as to whether consumer 
or capital goods are to be given preference. Moreover, the 
low level of savings implies t hat the Government would have 
to rely on external sources for capital funds.l 
III. The work of the Preparatory Commission. 
Although all previous studies (including the 1952 
White Paper) indicated that t h e scheme might be undertaken 
with reasonable assurance of success, the participants were 
of the opinion that additional preparation was still needed.2 
This caution was motivated by the magnitude of the project 
and its Lmplications with respect to available resources 
for other development programs in the Gold Coast.3 A Prepa-
ratory Commission was therefore established by the two 
governments, and was assigned four principal duties:4 
(i) in conjunction with the Gold Coast Government, 
it would attempt to integrate the project into 
the country's separate development .programs in 
the light of limited quantities of resources; 
(ii) it would participate in the determination of 
the constitution and powers of the Volta River 
Authority; 
(iii) it would continue the earlier investigations 
1. Handbook of Trade ~ Commerce, p. 20. 
2. CMD. 8702;-p. 7. 
3. lOIU., p. 6. 4. Ibid., p. 20. 
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with the aid of such staff as the aluminum 
companies could provide as well as with other 
consultants; and 
(iv) it would aid in the preparation of the re-
quired legal documents, a construction time-
table, and cost estimates. 
The Commission would be headed by a Special Commissioner who 
would 'tvork in close association 'td th the Gold Coast's ?Unis-
ter of Finance and Minister of Commerce and Industry.1 
The terms of reference were made more explicit with 
the appointment of the Special Commissioner in February, 
1953. The principal clarification was that the Commission 
should we~gh the conflicting demands on the resources in 
terms of materials, labor, managerial staff, public servi-
ces, social services, the rehabilitation and resettlement 
of communities uprooted by the scheme, and imports. 2 The 
Co:m._rnission 1 s report summarized the expanded terms of refer-
ence in this way: "In short, the basic terms of reference 
of the Preparatory Co~~ission were 1 Is the Project feasible?rn3 
The small size of the Commission required the utiliza-
tion of appropriate governmental agencies and independent 
foreign advisers;4 the Commission's staff consisted only of 
1 • Ibid • ' p • 21 • 
2. Preparatory Commission, The Volta River Project, Vol. II 
(London, H.M.s.o., 1956), p. 23. 
3. Ibid., p. 24. 
4. e.g., Dr. A.E. Morgan of TVA and Professor W.A. Le'tns. 
·, 
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five persons, and did not include any Gold Coast officials 
until 1955 when they could be made available.1 Consultation 
with these agencies resulted in the Commission's awareness 
of local opinion in the country. 2 That the Commission's 
work dealt with so varied a range of activities within its 
terms of reference made this aspect of its investigations-
the consulting of local opinion- a method of drawing to-
gether the attitudes of the participants in the scheme.3 
The Commission entered upon its investigations with 
the knowledge that it did not have to draft a proposal for 
the project, because the 1952 White Paper had clearly defined 
the framework and financial arrangements for the scheme. 
vfuat it had to do was, first, to determine the technical 
feasibility of the project; i.e., to survey the rainfall 
catchment area, the topographical needs of the transmission 
lines, the sites for the construction camp and for the pro-
posed townships, the railway connections, labor problems, 
1. Ibid., p. 24. 
2. Ibid., pp. 24 f. 
3. The conflict of interests was, perhaps, the basic reason 
for establishing the Commission. The Commission notes 
t~is conflict in connection with the debate in the Gold 
Coast Legislative Ass.embly. Only after Mr. Nkrumah' s po-
licy statement of July 3, 1953, in which he assured the 
Assembly .that the country would have sufficient represen-
tation on the Commission and facilities for expressing 
local opinion to that body (namely, through a Gold Coast 
National Committee and the Assembly itself), was confi-
dence restored to the Assembly. Also, an "effective and 
harmonious relationship" was fostered between the Com-
mission and the aluminum companies with the appointment 
in 1953 of Dr. Grimes-Graeme as resident representative 
of the aluminum interests in the Gold Coast. (Pp. 25 f.) 
22. 
questions relating to local communities, and t he timetable.l 
In order to complete its analysis of the technical aspects 
of the project, the Commission inv~ted the aluminum compa-
nies to continue t heir independent studies of the mines and 
the smelter. 2 Only if the results of these inquiries were 
favorable would the Commission proceed to the second stage-
a study of the cost estimates in cooperation with Aluminium 
Laboratories and Cooper Brothers, and, finally, to the third 
phase of its work- the preparation of the legal documents 
and agreements in accordance with the terms of reference.3 
Sir William Halcrow and Partners were engaged by the 
Commission as consulting engineers; the firm investigated 
matters pertaining to the power station and the railways in 
conjunction with Aluminium Laboratories and the Gold Coast 
Railways and Harbours Administration.L~ The aluminum compa-
nies cooperated with t he Commission and the Gold Coast in 
studying the mines, the smelter, and the township at Kpong.5 
The Gold Coast considered t h e port of Tema, and the Commis-
sion reserved for itself the investigation of over-all la-
bor requirements and the cost estimates.6 
Throughout the course of its work, the Commission fre-
1. !610: •. , pp. 27 ff. 
2. Ibi<I., p. 28. 
3. Ibid.' pp. 30 f . 4. Ibid.' p. 32. 
5. Ibid., p. 32. 
6. Ibid., p. 32. 
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quently submitted progress reports t~ the participants in 
the project. The final report was completed in December, 
1955;1 the report was optimistic as to the prospects for the 
scheme. 2 
What the Commission proposed did not differ from the 
1952 1ihite Paper in any of the physical or institutional 
aspect.s of the scheme. The Preparatory Commission revised 
upwards the estimates made in 1952, because of its more ac-
curate knowledge of the various cost items, and owing to 
its decision to increase the capacity of the power station 
by ten per cent3 in order to make the best use of the avail-
able water supply at the dam.4 The revised estimates included 
an addition of forty-five per cent of the total costs to 
compensate for possible miscalculations and for any increase 
in the price level which could occur during the construc-
tion period.? The following table indicates that the total 
COMPARISON OF 1952 AND 1956 COST ESTIMATES 
Year 
1952 
1956 
1st Stage 
100.5 
215.0 
(million pounds) 
2nd Stage 3rd Stage 
114.5 144.6 
246.0 309.0 
estimated cost had more than doubled in a period of about 
1. Ibid., p. 35. 
2. Preparatory Commission, The Volta River Project, Vol. I 
(London, H.M.s.o., 1956) pp. 3 f. 
3. The Volta River Project, Vol. II, p. 374. 
4. Ibid., p. 358. 
5. Ibid., pp. 421 r. 
four years- a fact that evoked the most response from the 
participants in the project. 
IV. The reaction to the Preparatory Commission's report. 
The United Kingdom and t h e aluminum companies were of 
the same opinion in their evaluations of the Commission's 
report. The United Kingdom Exchequer's Bulletin for Indus-
try connnented that the proposed scheme was one " ••• which 
can be financed only if there is a large surplus on our 
current balance of payments."1 This comment reflected not 
only the scarcity of loanable funds in the United Kingdom, 
but also its reluctance to limit s9buch of its resources to 
one undertaking. Mr. Nathaniel Davis, president of Alu..mi-
nium Limited, stated: 2 
The relative lack of basic facilities such 
as transportation, communications, housing 
and trained labour pools, requires large 
capital investments in a variety of fields 
to lay the necessary foundations for large 
developments. Secondly, and partly for the 
foregoing reasons, private-risk capital is 
reluctant to ~enture into new areas unless 
the prospects of returii"O'n investment ~ 
be made to compensate for the increased 
rfsks'"""i's'S'1i111ed. - -
This statement indicated the conditions which would have to 
be fulfilled prior to consideration of large scale invest-
ment. The Gold Coast was unable to meet these preconditions 
for two reasons: (1) its existing physical resources, and 
1. Cited in West Africa, May 5, 1956, p. 242. 
2. Ibid., May-;; 1956, p. 242. The underlining is mine. 
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(2) inadequate funds. 
Professor Hazlewood indicated that port congestion, 
shortages of foreign-made supplies and of local staff and 
labor, and the mounting recurrent costs of previous capital 
expenditure were the causes of the delays in the 1951 deve-
lopment program.l In a later article, he quoted the Gold 
Coast's Development Progress Report 1955 which noted that 
the recurrent charges were draining the country's financial 
resources, and that future expenditure would therefore be 
confined to "revenue earning 11 projects.2 Ghana's inability 
to finance its development plan was partly because of the 
continuous decline in government revenue since the 1954-
1955 fiscal year, o't-ring to the decline in cocoa prices to 
between one hundred seventy and two hundred pounds per ton.3 
In his August, 1956, budget message, Finance Minister Gbe-
damah announced that development funds would be augmented 
only if the world cocoa price exceeded two hundred pounds 
per ton; he also stated that budgetary deficits would be 
covered from the existing development funds.4 Whether or 
not such measures were called for,5 this discussion does 
indicate Ghana's need for new sources of funds to implement 
1. Ibid., April 7" 1956, p. 153. 
2. A. Hazlewood, 'Ghana's Finances", Oxford University 
Institute of Connnonwealth Studies, Reprint Series No. 18, 
pp. 11 f. --
3. West Africa, March 9, 1957, p. 233. 4. TOia., september 1, 1956, pp. 655 f. 
5. "Ghana's Finances", p. 11. He questioned the justification 
for taking such action. 
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its development plans which would provide the services re-
quired by }~. Davis f or investment in the Volta scheme. 
Official Ghana's attitude towards t h e project was not 
affected by the report of t he Preparatory Commission; the 
project has remained an integral part of Nkrumah's program, 
and has even been placed under his personal supervision.l 
This position does not imply, however, that Ghana would be 
financially able to undertake the scheme unilaterally; Pro-
fessor Hazlewood observed that " ••• the estimated capital 
cost of the scheme ••• (is) a fi gure which dwarfs Ghana's 
own f inancial resources.n 2 Ghana made overtures to a pri-
vate American group, the United States Government, and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in an 
attempt to obtain capital funds for the project. The pri-
vate American group failed to meet Nkrumah's deadline of 
July 18, 1957, for submitting proposals to the Ghana Govern-
ment. A bid for assistance from the United States was made 
early in 1958; if granted, however, such aid was not expec-
ted to exceed twenty-five million dollars.3 The Bank sent a 
three man mission to the country to examine the economic 
structure, a prerequisite to consideration of any loan ap-
1. West Africa, July 7, 1956, p. 462. 
2. '1'!"ffii'ina•s Finances", p. 11. 
3. Three Monthly Economic Review Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, Gambia, No. 21, 1958, pp. 1 f. - ·· 
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plications made to the Bank; the report has not yet been 
published, but one source believes that the conclusions 
suggest a cautious approach to the scheme.l 
The apparant apathy on the part of all concerned with 
the project has brought forth a suggestion from the econo-
mist, Walter Birmingham, that Ghana should carry out a 
"Baby Volta" scheme; he would have a smaller power station 
constructed in oraer to stimulate small enterprise along 
the Lower Volta River. 2 The Ghana Government recently an-
nounced its intention of proceeding with the development of 
a twenty million dollar power station at Bui,3 a site on 
the Volta which was rejected as a possible location for the 
power station of the Volta Project.4 Both of these new 
schemes reflect Ghana's desire for a hydro-electric scheme 
and, at the same time, the necessity of confining its under-
takings to ventures which would not impose too heavy a bur-
den on the country. 
The optimism which was associated with the 1952 pro-
posals has been dissipated by t he cost factor. Although the 
aluminQm companies and the United Kingdom have backed out 
of the scheme, Ghana has nevertheless been attempting to 
recruit new capital in order to bring the project to frui-
1. Ibid., No. 20, 1957, p. 2. 
2. West Africa, January 19, 1957, p. 51._· 
3. Three Monthly Economic Review, No. 21, 1958, p. 2. 4. The Volta River Project, Vol. I, p. 17. 
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tion. That Ghana continues to press for the scheme suggests 
that two aspects of the Commission's investieations be re-
considered and elaborated upon in view of Ghana's motives: 
(1) the affect of the project on sectors of the economy, and 
(2) the state of the aluminum market. These two matters, 
which are considered in the ensuing chapters, would seem to 
be crucial in evaluating the prospects for the scheme and, 
therefore, the wisdom of the Government's policy. 
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CHAPTER TWO: SOHE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE DAH 
One of the di f ficulties with central economic planning 
is calnulating the interrelationship of new projects with 
other sectors of the economy because of the re-allocation 
of factors of production. It is clear from the discussion 
of the work of the Preparatory Commission in the first chap-
ter t hat the investigations 1..rere primarilly concerned with 
the influence of internal f actors within Ghana upon the 
various comp onents of the project- e. g ., the recruitment of 
l abor, the locations of t he sites f or the several parts of 
the scheme, and the phasing of the stages of construction. 
The_se considerations a.~e certainly important, but they ig-
nore the possible effects of the project upon Ghana's eco-
nomy. 
This chapter 1-Till undertake a detailed analysis of the 
one aspect of the Commission's work which dealt with the 
possible consequences of the project upon sectors of Gha-
na's economy- namely, the effect of the dam upon the regions 
above and below the dam-site at Ajena. The Commission did 
realize t hat many diverse communities would be displaced 
as a result of the flooding upstream, and that the down-
stream fishing and agricul turalJ. patterns would be altered 
owing to expected changes in the rate of flow of the Volta 
River. The problem is not simply to recognize the fact that 
repercussions could result because of the project, but, in 
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addition, that the relationships are of a complex nature 
and difficult to ascertain. 
It may be stated at the outset that the Commission's 
investigations in the two · areas differ in quality; the 
study of the region downstream is complete enough such that 
the results obtained by the investigators need only be sum-
marized, whereas t he study of t he area subject to inundation 
appears to be mere description and incomplete in several in-
stances. In evaluating these two studies, a comparison will 
be made between them to distinguish between good and poor 
economic planning in an underdeveloped area. 
I. Effects on the region above the dam-site. 
The Volta River would be backed up behind the dam at 
Ajena to fo~· a lake, the waters of which would be used to 
power the turbines in the production of the electricity. 
The Commission estimated that this lake would submerge ap-
proximately three thousand five hundred square miles of 
land lying below the two hundred eighty foot contour; this 
level was selected, because it represented a safety margin 
in terms of the actual extent of the flooding, health and 
1 ' 
access to the waters of the lake. The use of the term, 
''lake", is perhaps inappropriate, for the waters would not 
be concentrated into one area, but would overflow the banks 
of the Volta and its tributaries as far north as the Gonja 
1. ~Volta River Project, Vol. II, pp. 69 f. 
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District in the Northern Territories. 
The studies were made in 1954 in cooperation with se-
veral governmental departments. Population and property 
rights were investigated by Messrs. J.P. Chalke and M. K. 
Jonas of t he Chief Valuer's Office; W. R. Smith and Mr. La 
Anyame of the Department of Agriculture surveyed cocoa and 
perennial crops, respectively. Also involved in this work 
were the Commissioner of Lands and Mr. A.C. Russell who 
looked into t h e problems of compensation and resettlement.l 
Apart from t hese studies, the Commission had at its disposal 
- . 
little other information on which to ·base its recommenda-
tions: t he District Headquarters a t Kete Krachi k ept few 
and incomplete recordes; reports of t he s everal government 
dep artments referred to the area only in passing ; Mr. D. 
Westwood's notes of his journey across t h e Af ram Plains in 
1946 and Dr. rJf . Field's monograph on. Krobo customs were 
made available to the Commission. The only other sources 
were the report of the 1948 census and aerial photographs 
taken in 1950 and 1951. 2 
An estimated sixty-two thousand f ive hundred persons 
inhabit the area which was divided into n mne sectors: Kwabu, 
South Afram, Akwamu, Ewe-G~ang, Buem-Akan, Pal, Krachi, Vol-
ta River Confederacy (Ashanti), and Gonja. In each sector, 
surveys were made of cocoa and sample counts were taken of 
l ~ Ibid;, pp. 68 ff. 
2. Ibid., p. 70 f. 
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perennial crops; the population of each village containing 
more than t wenty houses was enume.ra ted.1 The areas where 
crops were sampled '\..rere selected on t he a ssumption that the 
localities chosen were more productive than other sections 
of the regions. 
(i) The area considered. 
(1) Kwahu District. 2 
Over eight hundred square miles of land on the bank s 
of the Afram River, the western bank of the Volta, and the 
southern bank of the Obosum River would be flooded in t h is 
district. The Commission estimated that ten thousand per-
sons inhabited this savannah country, although approxi-
mately half of them were Ewe and Tongu settlers living along 
the Volta. The popula tion is concentrated in thirteen prin-
cipal _villages listed below; the f irst seven are in t h e vi-
KI-JAHU DISTRI CT: POPULATION 
Village l931 1~¥§ i6i~ 1.Vorobong 261 
Nkatepa 126 62 145 
Asuboni(a) 465 
Okrajei 312 337 591 
A chi- 104 260 
Petiko 219 254 184 
Aframso(a) 247 
Nkame 78 170 548 
Asabi 102 406 325 
Atikpale 81 535 401 
Fa so 129 80 306 
Kpale(a) 200 
Dadiase 63 19 250 (a) The 1948 census is not 
clear. 
1; Ibid;; p~ -72. 
2 . Ibid., pp. 87-92 passim. 
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cinity of the Afram River, and the others are primarilly 
Ewe settlements along the Volta. In the above table com-
piled from the 1948 Census Report and the counts made by 
- -
Hessrs. Chalke and Jonas, an attempt is made to indicate 
the degree and extent of population growth. Although the 
accuracy of this data is subject to question because of the 
conditions under which the census was made,l no other in-
formation is available. The table indicates large increases 
in several villages, especially in those along the Afram 
River where the people are indigenous to the area. 
Individual land tenure prevails in the Kwahu villages, 
subject to the powers of the principal chiefs to alienate 
land and to the jurisdiction over specific regions by les-
ser chiefs; Kwahu settlers can therefore be made the sub-
jects of discrimination. The situation corresponds to a 
confederation in the opinion of the Commission. 
Cocoa was found in the entire threatened area, although 
prospects for its commercial development along the Obosum 
River were considered poor for lack of communications faci-
. . . 
lities. Surveys made near Petiko and Nkame revealed more 
2 than f. ourteen thousand four hundred acres of oil palms; 
considerable acreage 1-ras devoted to the cul ti va tion of man-
go and coconut trees also. Maize, manioc, and plantain were 
1. One difficulty encounterea was the abscence of some vil-
lagers on the day of the census. 
2. Ibid., p. 70. 
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grown for local consumption, and farming was found to be 
almost exclusively for local consumption along the northern 
bank of the Afram River and the Volta's west barur. There-
gion may t herefore be considered a supplier of certain com-
mercial crops, but of little significance in providing food 
crops to other parts of Ghana. 
(2) South Afram District.1 
All of the land in this district bordering t h e Afram 
and Pa~mpawn r ivers would be flooded; the Commission did 
not indicate the size of the area however. Approximately 
fifteen t housand persons inhabited this area, which was 
characterized by a poor drainage system and shallow soil; 
the r·1anya Krobo group 1-1ere t he most populous, and the re-
mainder of the population were Akwamu, Akim, and Yilo Krobo. 
There were no observed villages in the district nor any 
data as to popula tion distribu tion; this paucity of infor-
mation was due in part to the fact that Krobo custom allows 
individual land tenure. 
The district was found to be intensively cultivated in 
both perennial and seasonal crops in spite of adverse farm-
ing conditions. More than two thousand seven hundred acres 
of cocoa and over one million six hundred thousand oil 
~alms, all of which were expected to bear fruit by 1961, 
were grown. In the district's ninety-four acres of forest 
1. Ibid., pp. 93-95 passim. 
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reserves, sixty thousand trees of commercial value were 
enumerated. 
(3) Akwamu District.l 
Sixty-nine square miles of land in this district which 
lies adjacent to South Afram extending to the hills on the 
right bank of the Volta and south to Ajena would be inunda-
ted by the lake. It was estimated that this savannah country 
was the home of four thousand four hundred sixty-five per-
sons, although between five hundred and one thousand people 
lived outside the district. The Commission gave no explana-
tion for this migration, although one might look to the li-
mited economic opportunities- namely, maize farming, as a 
factor. This suggestion is substantiated in part by the fact 
that less than half the population were Akwamu, most of the 
inhabitants being of Tongu origin. 
(4) Trans-Volta Ewe-Guang District. 2 
One hundred eighty square miles of grassland would be 
submerged in this region which is situated along the east-
ern bank of the Volta north of Akwamu and adjacent to Kwahu. 
Living in the area were approximately five thousand seven 
hu~dred persons, o~ whom about ~hree thousand five hundred 
were indigenous to the district. More than seventy per cent 
of the local population lived in the Ablode Local Council 
1~ Ibid~' pp~ 9~-98 passim. · 
2. Ibid., pp. 98-103 passim. 
in the north; the remainder resided in the Peki state. 
~NE-GUANG DISTRICT: POPULATION 
xi11age 1931 194~ 195~ 
gbesia(a) 273 23 69 
Tsome(b) 199 281 921 
Dzfadzi(a) 245 594 431 
Tonkaw 357 158 626 
Kaira 75 ~35 339 (a) includes two vil ages 
(b) includes four villages 
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The population data above is for five villages, the 
f irst three of which are in the north. This information 
seems to indica te a population growth, but this judgement 
is subject to several qualifications. Dzfadzi, comprising 
tvm villages, declined by about twenty-seven and one-half 
per cent, and Kaira by almost t wenty-two per cent since 
1948. In addition, half the population of Tonkaw and Kaira 
w~re n?n-resident; this situation might be explained by 
t he declining productivity of the cocoa farms. As for vil-
lages not listed above, the Commission stated without ela-
boration that Todome could be a large village and that 
Aglama and Dukludja are of insignificant size; 1931 and 
1948 data confirm these statements. 
Land tenure in the district is communal, the people 
coming under the authority of lineage heads. Cocoa was 
farmed only in the south near Kaira and Tonkaw; seventy-se-
ven of the one hundred ten acres devoted to this crop were, 
however , beyond t heir peak bearing periods. Oil palms and 
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mango trees were the principal crops in the north, although 
they were also grown in the south; the two sample counts 
made by Mr. La Anyame revealed that eight thousand four 
hundred sixty-eight acres were cultivated 1-vi th oil paLms, 
especially in the Dayi River Valley. Maize was grown in the 
Tongu settlements along the Volta. Another aspect of the 
e?o~omy w~ich would be disrupted was the manufacture of clay 
pots for sale in the market at Kpandu; the pits provided lo-
-· -
cal women with the basic material for this work. 
(5) Buem-Akan District.l 
Eighty-five square miles of savannah land, occupied by 
one thousand seven hundred persons, would be submerged in 
this district. Three distinct ethnic groups were found here: 
(1) the Nkonya of Akan origin, (2) the Tapa of Akan origin, 
and t3~: the Bowiri of Ewe origin. Land tenure was influenced 
by these divisions: the Tapa lands were under the authority 
of a paramount chief, and the Bowiri lands were owned by 
extended family gr,oups. 
The villag es- Tokloso, Kalikonto, Breniase, and Odei-
would be flooded; the Commission published population data 
~or the last two villages only, and this information would 
seem to indicate a growing population. Un~ortunately, no 
consideration was given to the possible e~~ects upon set-
tled areas beyond the ~lood zone which were nevertheless 
1. Ibid., pp. 104-106 passim. 
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tied economically to the threatened region; it is clear 
that Ahenkrom, Wuropong, . K~amikrom, Amanfrom, and Akanie.m 
would all be affected. All of these villages were situated 
near cocoa growing areas in t h e threatened region; moreover, 
t he f irst three are on the road linking the entire district 
to Accra. 
BUEM- AKAN DISTRICT: POPULATION 
Village 
BrEmiase 
Odei 
Ahenkrorii 
Wuropong 
K:wamikrom 
Amanfrom 
Akaniem 
151 
153 
749 
110 
138 
603 
28l.t.6 
11S6 
1379 
144 
3 9 
210 
The above t able indicates t he pattern of population 
growt h and distribution in t h e area; because villages 
outside t he f lood zone were not considered in the investi-
gati ons, no 1954 fi gures are available f or them. Some popu-
l a tion increase is noted where comparison is possible; more-
over, the large concentrations in 1.-luropong , Kwa.mikrom, and 
Amanfrom reflect the economic importance of cocoa and com-
munications in the area. Oil palms are also significant in 
the district, as are clay pits and fishing areas. 
(6) Pai Distr1ct.1 
The one hundred eighty s quare miles of savannah land 
which would be f looded in this district are bounded on three 
sides by t he legal boundaries of Togoland and by the Oti 
w ~ ' • 
1. Ibid., pp. 106-108 passim. 
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River on the northern side. Four thousand six hundred per-
sons, including one thousand six hundred Pais, were enume-
rated; other ehhnic groups included Kwahu, Krachi, and Ada 
peoples. The Commission conceded that these tribal groups 
could come into conflict during the resettlement of the 
population. 
PAI DISTRICT: 
xillage 1931 
kroso 
Apaso 401 
Asempaneye 
Kawnoso 
Kwaku-
Dukomang 
Otisu 222 
POPULATION 
19~"8 195~ 2 2 40 
1727 1139 
331 342 
174 186 
182 440 
310 494 
A large part of the population was concentrated in the 
six villages listed above. Excepting Akroso which is located 
near cocoa growing areas, all the villages are situated on 
roads or near the .fishing areas of the Volta and Oti rivers. 
Only Apaso, the largest village, shows an absoluted decline 
since 1948 which may be because of the fact that it is not 
on a main road, and, therefore, of less economic importance 
than the others. The presence of a large mission school and 
t he fact that fi fty-three per cent of the 1948 population were 
under sixteen years of age may imply t hat some were influ-
enced to leave in quest of better opportunities as a result 
of the knowledge they may have acquired in school. Asempa-
neye was considered a special case by the Commission, be-
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cause it would be surrounded completely by the lake. 
Agricultural activity was concentrated a~ong the main 
roads indicating the importance of trade in the district. 
That yams and oil palms were cultivated f or export and that 
the United Africa Company leased the b..ro ferries over t h e 
Asukawkaw and Oti rivers and maintained four offices at the 
crossings at Akroso and Otisu support t his suggestion. 
(7) Krachi District.l 
The Oti, Volta, and Daka rivers set apart about five 
hundred t wenty square miles of savannah land and some forest 
areas which would be submerg ed in this district. Twelve 
thousand five hundred thirty-three persons were enumerated 
in several villages, the larges of which was Kete Krachl, 
which gre1;r from about two thousand to t hree t housand five 
hundred since 19L~8. The rest of the district increased by 
one t h ousand f ive hundred persons. In the cocoa areas, t h e 
population increase was of the order of one hundred thirty-
nine per cent, esp ecially at Atafie which grew by tHo hun-
dred fifty-five per cent. All the villages along the Volta 
and Oti rivers and along the Kete Krachi-Yendi road s howed 
gains. 
Oil palms were thought to be of more commercial signi-
ficance to the district than cocoa. There was both consider-
able extensive and intensive food cultivation along the 
1. Ibid., pp. 108-112 passim. 
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roads: yams realized a value of fity pounds per acre, gui-
nea corn twenty-four pounds, maize fourteen pounds, and 
rice seventeen pounds. Roads were thought to be the key 
factor in agricultural development; only two hundred thirty 
square miles of land (all near roads) out of two thousand 
seven ~undred fifty square miles of arable land were being 
farmed. The disruption of road communications throughout t he 
district is significant therefore; moreover, some routes 
would be so severed as to isolate entire villages, as, for 
example, t he settlements north of Buaf ori. 
The ferry crossing at Kete Krachi would be widened; 
which could mean that dif ferent capital equipment would be 
required. Th e importance of t he ferry is, of course, its 
role in transporting much migrant labor from Togoland to 
Ashanti and other parts of Ghana. 1 The presence of a 
slaughter house at Kete Krachi suggests that the northern 
cattle market would be affected by the flooding also. 
(8) Ashanti: Volta River Confederacy. 2 
Six hundred thirty-five square miles of savannah land 
along the Pru, Volta, Sene, and Obosum rivers would be sub-
merg ed in the district. Four tribes- the Nkomi, Basa, 
Ajadi, and Akroso- were enjoying common land rights as a 
result of an agreement among the chief s in 1945 which placed 
1. R.B. Davison, Migrant Labour in the Gold Coast - (Achimota, 
University College of the Gold Coast~54), p. 1. · 
2. The Volta River Project, Vol. II, pp. 112-114 passim. 
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the tribes under a common authority. 
Four thousand three hundred ninety persons were 
thought to make the district their home, although about 
nine hundred were non-permanent residents of the district. 
Three thousand two hundred eighty-five people resided in 
VOLTA RIVER CONFEDERACY: POPULATION 
~llage 1931 1~ 1§~% 
( -~) indicates the eight villages 
referred to in the text. 
190 
95 
350 
450 
400 
600 
400 
eight villages. In every case except Dodi Dafo and Nsunua, 
a large population growth was observed; the mean averages 
for 1948 and 1954 were two hundred forty-six and four hun-
dred twenty-one persons, respectively. Kwadjokram and Basa 
are located outside t h e f~ood zone along the Nsunua-Atebubu 
road linking northern Togoland to Mampong and Kumasi; al-
though this route would not be impaired, the more direct 
road to Accra (via Kete Krachi) would be submerged. Further-
more, the canoe ferry at Akroso would be disrupted; it is 
possible that migrant labor from Togoland might have sought 
employment in or brought trade to these villages, if the 
ferry crossing would not be widened. 
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Tropical fruits were the principal cash crops grown in 
the district; sample counts made near Nsunua and Akroso re-
vealed o~er one thousand two hundred acres of oil palms.l 
Lack of communications and poor soil quality might explain 
why so little f ood farming was found in the district; it is 
noteworthy that the villages en~~erated by the Commission 
were situated along roads or the river indicating that lar-
ger settlements (containing more than twenty houses) were 
in the vicinity of means of communication. 
(9) Gonja District. 2 
Six hundred thirty s quare miles of savannah land along 
the Pru, Volta, and Black Vol~a rivers vrould be flooded. 
Four thousand persons were enamerated in forty-six v~llages, 
none of which was found to have more than five hundred in-
habitants. The Conmission referred only to five settlements, 
and did not consider several large villages outside the 
GONJA DISTRICT: POPULATION 
Borumasi~:­
Kafaba.;:· 
Kpembe-::-
Kuli 
Mall:ongo 
Pad"jae 
Salaga.;:- · 
Salt . Tovm 
Tuluwe.;:-
Tut:tga 
Yapei 
Ye i~:-
ages 
58 46 
519 718 
66 59 
123 242 
129 166 
4826 3153 
347 410 
171 136 
291 !~23 
707 233 
832 1351 
1~ Ibid~;, p. ' 72. 
2. Ibid., pp . 114-116 passim. 
1954 
200-L~oo 
200-400 
~-
threatened region. 
Agriculture was important in terms of local consump-
tion; negligible amounts of commercial crops were found in 
the district. Two activities of importance were the Tongu 
- . . 
fishing industry and the earthenware manufacture carried on 
by women in the vicinity of the Kwayease clay deposits; the 
latter industry employed about five hundred women, and yielded 
an annual product valued at approximately fifteen thousand 
. .. . .. ,; .. . 
pounds. One of t he main cattie routes from the Northern 
Territories passes throu~h Yeji and Salaga, where there is 
an immunisation camp, would be di srupted. Because most 
route~ ~ almost per~endicular to the coast, there are few 
connections; in this case, the only link between main routes 
is a road between Gushiago and Mangpa which, however, was 
thought suitable only for goats and sheep. 
The ferry at Yeji is of considerable importance to the 
district and to Ghana because of its role in transporting 
migrant labor to the southern parts of the country. Between 
1947 and 1952, passenger traffic on all ferries more than 
, , 
doubled.1 In the survey made by ~~. Davison in March, 1954, 2 
more than sixty-four per cent of the travellers were found 
to be returning (via Yeji) from employment in the southern 
areas of Ghana.3 Most of this labor was employed in agri-
1~ Davison, ·p. · l. 
2~ Ibid~; p~ 6. · 
3. Ibid., p. 15. 
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culture- particularly on food farms as distinguished from 
-· -. -
cocoa farms, which were defined so as to include any rarms 
on which cocoa was grown. 1 Ashanti benefited most rrom this 
movement; sixty-two per cent or the labor force took employ-
ment in the territory, eighty-eight per cent or whom were 
in agriculture (primarilly rood farming). 2 The ferry was 
round to be important to trade also; ten per cent or the 
total number of wage earners described themselves as "car-
riers" in the trading system.3 Yeji is itself important as 
the site or the ferry; Mr. Davison noted that Yeji was se-
lected for the interviews rather than Salaga or Pwalugu 
-· . 
(near the Bolgatanga ferry), because " ••• the travellers 
.. 
break their journey there as a matter of habit •••• "4 To dis-
rupt the operation of this ferry would therefore have the 
affect of altering the economic structure of areas in Ghana 
not directly related to the dam, because the ferry crossing 
would be widened by five miles5 which could reduee the num-
ber of trips and require different equipment. 
(ii) The Commission's recommendations. 
The Commission recognized that the project would have 
a legal obligation to compensate the people who would be 
displaced by the flooding; the problem was as to the form 
1~ n;ra: ~, p~ 22~ 
2. Ibid~; p; 24~ 
3~ Ibid~; p~ 22~ 4; I'6ICI., p. 39. 
5. The Volta River Project, Vol. II, p. 249. 
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of the settlements. Cash payment was rejected, because it 
was felt that this method would not provide a sound econo-
mic f oundation f or the communities.1 It was t herefore de-
cided that same form of resettlement would be the best 
policy. 
Relocating the communities would be based on the prin-
ciple of "self-help". Cash payments would be made f or the 
losspf _individual property rights and construction material 
and technical advice would be made available, but the 
. -. ,. . -
people themselves would actually reconstruct their villages 
- . ' .. 
in new locations which would be agreeable to them. 2 In 
every case, it was agreed that the program of resettlement 
should take advantage of the community spirit of the dif-
3 ferent groups. 
The Commission estimated t hat fifty-one new settlements 
would have to be provided in all the districts with the ex-
ception of South Afram where individual land tenure was 
practiced. Five criteria were designated for determining 
the location of new villag es: {1) suitable sour ces of 1...rater 
and land, (2) access to roads , (3) simple layouts, (4) com-
munal buildings- e. g ., schools, market stalls, and public 
latrines, and (5) wells.4 The Commission's forecast of the 
. . 
1~ Ibid~; pp. 123 f ~ 
2~ Ibid~; pp\ 124 ff. 
3 ~ Ibid~ ; p ~ ·125. · 4. Ibid., pp. 125 f. 
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number and sizes of the villages is summarized in the fol-
lowing table. These estimates indicate that the Commission 
FORECAST OF NEW VILLAGE REQUIREMENTS! 
District 
Kwahu 
Akwamu 
Ewe-Guang 
Buem-Akan 
Pai 
Krachi 
Volta River 
Confederacy 
8 1- 12oo 
7.;. 200-600 
4 1- 800 (Ajena) 
3- less than 500 
9 2- 500-1000 
7- 200-500 
2 2- 200~400 
5 1- 1200 
4- 300-500 
9 1~ Kete Krachi 
7 
8- 200-600 
1-
6-
a 7 7~ 
800 
200-600 
200- 00 
in terms of population. 
desired the peoples not only to resettle themselves, but 
also to consolidate themselves into fewer and larger vil-
lages; for example, the forty-six inundated communities in 
Gonja would be relocated in seven villages. 
One reason for this concentration might be the scar-
city of land available f or resettlement. In only two dis-
tricts- Buem-Akan and Gonja, no problems were anticipated 
in finding suitable locatiions. 2 Although the residents of 
Akwamu district had already indicated a preference as to a 
new location, the Commission was unable to guarantee that 
that land was available.3 Only a few Krobos from South Afram 
1; Ibid~; p; 125; 
2; Ibid~; p~ 129; 
3. Ibid., p. 129. 
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could be assured of resettlement, and no indication could 
be given to the great majority of the Krobos as to the a-
. 
vailability of sites.l Although considerable unoccupied 
land was noted in Kwahu and the Volta River Confederacy, 
that land rights would be infringed upon was an ever present 
danger; 2 lack of communications posed an additional problem 
for the Volta River Confederacy.3 The proposed sites for 
the Pai and Krachi communities would fringe the lake in the 
abscence of other alternatives.4 That the land of the Ablode 
Local Council was already extensively cultivated, and t hat 
no land was available for so large a community as Tsome 
presented t he greatest problems in the Ewe-Guang district.5 
Neither the Konkomba nor the Tongu settlers would re-
ceive compensation because of their "stranger" status in 
the upstream area.6 The Konkomba were described _as a migra-
tory people from the northeast section of Ghana;? their 
housing and behavior patterns reflected this characteristic.8 
The Commission's investigators observed t hem in Krachi where 
t hey engaged in intensive yam cultivation.9 The Tongu people 
emigrated from their traditional homes downstream in their 
1 ~ Ibid~ ; p ~ · 128 • 
2; Ibid~; pp. 128 r. 
3~ Ibid; ; p; 129~ 
u_; Ibid;; p ~ 129; 
5~ Ibid~:, p ~ 1?9 • 
6~ Ibid;; p~ 130. 
7 ~ Ibid~ ; p ~ 8 0 ~ . 
8; Ibld~; p~ 110. 
9. Ibid., p. 80. 
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search for greater economic opportunities;1 moreover, the 
studies in the downstream area indicated that river fishing 
was unable to provide full employment to the inhabitants of 
the Tongu Local Councils. 2 
II. Effects upon the region below the dam. 
Just as the overabundance of water would cause diffi-
culties above the dam, so the possibilities of too little 
water and water polluted by the waste products from t h e 
smelter caused concern in the downstream area. As for the 
latter problem, the aluminum companies indicated that equip-
- -- ... 
ment designed to reduce pollution would be installed at the 
·-·· - . 
smelter.3 The former problem necessitated a wider study, 
because t he rate of river flow would be regulated at thir-
ty-eight thousand cubic feet per second (hereafter referred 
to as cusecs), which could affect agriculture and f ishing in 
the area;4 the normal rate rang ed from one thousand cusecs 
in February to from one hundred twenty-five thousand to 
three hundred ninety thousand cusecs during t he flood sea-
son in September and October.5 
Mrs. Rowena Lawson, formerly of the staff of Kumasi 
College of Technology, conducted an intensive survey of the 
. . . 
1; Ibid~; p~ 150: 
'2~ Ibid~; p~ 165; 
3; Ibid;; p~ 160; 
4: Ibid:~ p. 139: 5. !hid., p. 143. 
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economy at Batter, located in the middle reaches of the 
freshwater fishing area, so as to obtain a region which 
could be considered representative of the entire fifty-four 
mile stretch below the dam;1 the consulting engineers sur-
veyed conditions in t he lagoons and coastal areas. 2 Govern-
mental departments assigned staff members to assist in the 
investigations; among those assigned were :r-~essrs. Asafo, 
Kumasenu, and Brannner of the Dep:a.rtments of Ag~iculture, 
Fisheries, and Soil and Land Use, respectively.3 Except for 
brief references in geological and meteorological reports, 
previo':ls stud~es by Duncan Rose and_ the con~ulting engineers, 
and Mr. Montagu's report written for the Department of Agri-
. . . 
culture, the Commission had available little other informa-
tion.4 
(i) Results of the investigation. 
(1) Agriculture. 
The survey was made in 1954 to discern the influence 
of floods upon yields and local methods of production. Crop 
s.urveys were ~ade of seven hundred four acres of intensively 
cultivat~d land both before the harvest and after the 
floods. In addition, soil samples from three sectors into 
which the region was divided were analyzed.5 
1~ Ibia;; p~ 141~ 
2~ Ibia~, p~ 143~ 
3: Ibid;; p: 141; 
4~ Ibia ~; p~ 1L~2. 
5. '!bid.' p. 142. 
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More than half the adult population were engaged in 
food cultivation on farms averaging one-half acre each; 
each household farmed one and one-half acres, the yield of 
Which was valued at between twenty-five and thirty pounds 
per year.1 Cassava and groundnuts were grown throughout the 
~urvey area, whereas maize, sugar cane, .and sweet potatoes 
were cultivated only in regions suited to these crops. 2 
Flooding was not found to be a factor in the intensively 
cultivated areas of the Sikor peninsula, Devime district, 
and Kome Island; in some sectors~ Lasieve and Sokpoe, culti-
vation would be limited to cassava if water were in short 
supply.3 
The Commission was theref ore able to conclude that agri-
culture would not suff er too greatly, and that the use of 
fertilisers and the training of the population in better me-
thods could offset any adverse ef fects. The Commission did 
note that flooded land was forty-two per cent more. produc-
tive under current methods of production, and that the lack 
of f lood waters would be detrimental to agriculture in the 
long run.4 
(2) Fishing. 
Three types of fishing were found in the area: (1) main-
stream, (2) creek, and (3) clams and oysters. Mainstream 
1; Ibid;~ p~ 154; 
2~ !bid~; p. ' l54. ' 
3~ Ibid~; pp~ 161-173 passim. 
4. Ibid., pp. 174 f. 
fishing was found to be a casual occupation among the men 
partly because of the expense involved in procuring nets 
(the prices ranging from four pounds f or cast nets to from 
two hundred to two hundred f ifty pounds for sein~ nets, of 
which t hirteen are in operation). The average yield per 
seine net was eight hundred f orty pounds per season (Janu-
ary to July), 1-rhich was divided among the twelve men t-Iho 
worked the net; the market price of fresh fish was six pence 
per pound, price being governed by . the principles of supply 
and demand.l Th e Commission observed that the fishing sea-
son coincided with the low level of the river; figures show-
ing t he relationship of the yields to the river's level 
over a ten year p eriod were published as an app endix to this 
section of the report. 2 The Commission recommended that stu-
dies should be continued and that government administration 
be expanded.3 
Creek f ishing was also found to incur certain costs; 
fishing r i ghts had to be purchased or pledge~ and the me-
t hod of catching fi sh by fencing the outlets of t he creeks 
and placing traps in the fences involved an annual charge 
of from five pounds five shillings to twenty pounds five 
shillings. 4 The market price for such f ish was, hm·Iever, 
. . . 
1~ Ibid;; p~ 156~ 
2~ Ibid:; p. 190: 
3~ I'6Ia: ~ ; p. "l77. 
4 .• I'5ia., pp. 1.57 f. 
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higher than that for mainstream fish; rresh creek fish 
brought one shilling per pound in the market. 1 The creek 
fishing industry dep ended upon the level or water; t he Com-
mission indicated that several of these bodies of '\-rater 
would run dry, if the Volta's flow were maintained at a rate 
of thir ty-eight thou sand cusecs. 2 The conclusion that shal-
low creeks could be more prof itable in agriculture, rain-
fall providing the necessary water, was f inally arrived at 
by the Commission.3 
Clam and oyster fishing were found to be occupations 
p eculia r to women of t h e region; from one to two t housand 
women earned at least twenty-five thousand pounds in this 
activity. One hundr ed eleven out of one hundred eighty-four 
adult females at Battor wer e engag ed in this work, thirty-
nine of whom considered this t ype of fishing to be their 
principal occupation.4 That the work was of more than just 
local signi f icance is reflected in the fact that two-thirds 
of their catch was exported • .5 The Commission acknowledged 
t hat difficulties would be encountered if the rate of river 
flow were stabilized,6 because the method of catching clams 
was simply to pick them from. the shallow river bed.7 
. ~ . ' 
1~ Ibid;; p~ 1.58~ 
2 " Ibid~; p~ 176~ • 
3~ I'6:tCI ; ; p ; 164 ~ 
4~ Ibid~; -p: 1.57~ 
.5~ I'6id:~; p~ 1.57 ~ 
6: Ibid;; p: 17.5: 
7. I'6id., p. 1.57. 
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(3) Keta and Songaw Lagoons. 
The principal uses to which these areas were put were 
the production of salt and fish; in addition, intensive 
cultivation of onions at Keta has yielded an annual value 
1 
of two hundred fifty thousand pounds. A good season's salt 
yield at Ket~ was from five to six thousand tons, and could 
be increased to an estimated one hundred twenty-five thou-
. -
sand tons each year given a regulated flow of water. 2 Salt 
f ormation at Songaw was unpredictable owing to uncertain 
water supplies; this situation would likely be exaggerated 
by the loss of the Luhwe and Futwe channels as sources of 
water.3 The Commission suggested that sea fishing could be 
developed,4 and that erratic salt formation could be elimi-
nated by con~ructing channels to the sea.5 
{4) Communications and trade. 
The Commission recognized that the commercial relation-
ship of the downstream area to the rest of Ghana 'tvas of some 
significance. The report stated that the roads from Accra to 
Lome and to Hohoe in Togoland revitalized trade between the 
~reas. 6 Akuse and its port, Amedica, were the major trading 
centers of the region; Aveime and Adidome linked the area 
.. ' • w 
1.; ibia~; p~ 171; 
2~ Ibia~, p~ 171~ 
3; rEi a~, p. -172. 
4~ _!bid;; pp; 171 f; 
5~ Ibid;' pp. 177 f. 
6. I'6Ia:. , p. 152. 
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1.vi th Accra, Tema, and Kuma si; and Ada and Tefle were dis-
tribution centers for fish products. 1 Checks made at Aveime 
indicated that t here was considerable intra-regional trade 
in the market for locally produced commodities. 2 The Commis-
sion concluded t hat road transportation would not be signi-
ficantly affected, and t hat a stable river flow could lead 
to expansion of both road and river transportation facili-
ties.3 
III. Evaluation. 
The two studies considered above are distingulsh ed by 
the fact t hat the f ormer describes a region, "tvhereas the 
latter deals with an: analysis of conditions which were 
lik~ly to occur. The approaches were designed to produce 
recommendations to deal with two specific situations: (1) 
the displacement of entire communities, and (2) alterations 
in the economic structure of a region. 
That the study of the downstream area was analyt i cal 
is ref lected in the f a ct that t h e investigators sought to 
relate the economic activity of the sector to all of Ghana. 
The possible affects upon trade were stated explicitly as 
were t he adjustments whic~ mi ght have to be made in agricul-
ture and f ishing . Moreover, the Commission proce eded to in-
dicate meth ods of making adjustments to the benefit of the 
1~ !hia~, pp. 152 f. 
2~ Ibid ; ; p. ' 179. 
3. Ibid., pp. 179 r. 
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peoples concerned- e.g., local farmers would be trained in 
new methods of production and in the use of fertilisers. In 
summary, the recommendations were such as to take advantag e 
of the ef fects of the dam. 
The prior assumption of the construction of the scheme 
led the investigators away from an analysis of t he upstream 
area and of its potential. One criterion f or evaluating the 
ef fects of the project upon t he local economy might have 
been t he opportunity cost approach; i.e., the cost of losing 
t h e productivity of t he region a s compared with the gain in 
having t h e scheme. The Commiss i on was attempting to prove 
that the communities involved could be suitably accomoda ted 
in new localities without great hardship. 
That the investigators confined themselves to the area 
that would be submerged prevented a study of the repercus-
sions of the lake on communities lying outside the flood 
region. Only in the case of Asempaneye did the Commission 
consider a village which would not be inundated, because 
this particular community would be completely cut off from 
all other areas. The suggestion has however been made that 
communities, such as Ahenkrom and Salaga, would be affected 
in their relationship to other sectors of the economy; this 
possibility was not considered however. 
Trade vdthin the area was not discussed except for 
brief mention of the earthenware industry and the market 
price of food crops grown in Krachi. That the most inten-
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sively farmed areas were in the vicinity of roads indicates 
that the communities did relate themselves to commercial 
activity; the importance of commerce is also reflected in 
the considerable cultivation of c~~ercial crops. These 
facts suggest that the region is not isolated from Ghana's 
economy, although the Commission's failure to consider the 
interrelationship of this sector to the total economy could 
lead one to assume that subsistence agriculture is the pri-
mary economic activity of the region. A closer look at the 
facts tends to disprove this assumption, even though the 
facts may reveal only a low level of economic development. 
The results of the investigations cannot be said to 
represent a total view of economic activity within indivi-
dual districts, because they pertain only to the dominant 
groups within any district. The Tongu represent an obvious 
example of a community which was substantial thnoughout 
the entire area; this group was not considered, although 
their contributions in the provision of food products to 
the region and the extent to which their activity enabled 
indigenous communities to engage in commercial agriculture 
might have been legitimate subjects of inquiry. 
No statement was made of the reasonmng underlying the 
assumption that the areas selected for commercial crop 
sampling were the most productive. Although the counts were 
taken in limited regions of the districts, the conclusions 
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arrived at as a result of having this information were ap-
plied to entire districts. The assumption could be more ea-
sily accepted had the Commission shown that the sample 
areas were the most productive. 
The logic of the recommendations pertaining to reset-
tlement is subject to criticism also. The Commission recom-
mended a policy of 11 self-help 11 , but it made no statement 
concerning the provision of subsistence during the construc-
tion period. Nor did the recommendations suggest routes by 
which the people and materials would be moved into the new 
localities, inasmuch as communications in these new areas 
were less developed than in the vicinity of the existing 
settlements. The Commission suggested minimal needs .for the 
co~munities, although it did not indicate whether the new 
regions could provide the requirements. Neither did the 
Commission discuss the productivity of the lands in the 
proposed resettlement areas; the Commission indicated only 
that unoccupied land might be ~vailable for resettlement. 
All of t hese considerations lead to the conclusion that the 
Commission was inconsistent and did not study the problems 
in such a way as to justify its recommendations. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE VOLTA RIVER PROJECT AND ~ ALUMINUM 
~KET 
In the preceding chapter, consideration was given to 
one internal factor of the scheme- the economic consequen-
ces of the dam on the area subject to inundation. In the 
general discussion of the Preparatory Commission's work in 
the first chapter, their invest1~ations were shown to deal 
only with the physical and cost aspects of the project. All 
of these subjects are, however, internal matters in that 
they relate only to the construction of the components of 
the scheme. 
The fact is that Ghana does not provide, in the main, 
a market for aluminum and the demand for the metal cannot, 
therefore, be classified as an internal factor. The alumi-
num market is beyond the control of Ghana and the other 
participants in the scheme, and is, therefore, an external 
aspect of the project. 
The availability of a market for the Smelter Company's 
output at prices which would at least cover costs is of 
crucial importance. The prospects for the financial success 
of the scheme were uppermost in the minds of the partici-
pants, and the Ghana Government was aware of the fact that 
the construction of a power project solely to meet the in-
ternal demand for power was not economically justifiable. 
The problem which is considered in this chapter is, there-
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~ore, the nature of the al~inum market; the necessity for 
a favorable market for Ghana aluminum was expressed best in 
the periodical, West Africa, which commented in 1956:1 
It remains to be seen whether aluminum usage 
1dll continue to increase and bear out the 
confidence of those who have invested such 
enormous sums in expanding the industry. 
I. The Commission's outlook for the aluminum market. 
Only once did the Preparatory Commission discuss the 
demand for alumin~m. In chapter thirty-three of its report, 
the Commission stated that the survey, summarized in the 
1952 \~ite Paper, and the subsequent expansion of plant ca-
pacity throughout the world were indicators of the optimis-
tic future of the metal, consumption of which could be ex-
pected to increase at an annual rate o~ five per cent. 2 
It is not unusual that the Commission would take note 
of the prospects for alumintml due to the magnitude of the 
investment and the motives of the participants. What is un-
usual is the fact that the Commission relied largely on in-
formation pertaining to market conditions fi~e years prior 
to the publicatiion of its report, and that no consideration 
was given to t he implications of the expansion of capacity. 
In the following sections of this chapter, factors under-
lying the optimistic outlook for the demand and supply of 
1. West Africa, December 15, 1956, p. 1025. 
2. ~Volta River Project, Vol. I, pp. 98 ff. 
61. 
aluminum will be discussed in greater detail. 
II. The post-war demand for aluminum. 
Plant capacity had increased considerably after the 
outbreak of World War II because of the demands imposed by 
the war effort; this growth is illustrated in Chart I (page 
62) which depicts output from 1936 to 1957. Capacity was 
expanded from six hundred thirty-three thousand metric tons 
in 1939 to almost two million metric tons in 1943.1 That 
the expansion was tied to the war is reflected in the decline 
in production after 1943. 2 
Increased activity in the construction and transporta-
tion industries following yhe war enabled the aluminum in-
dustry to take up the slack due to excess capacity. Business 
~ reported that three hundred new buildings were erected 
with aluminum exteriors from 1952 to 1956.3 The metal was 
easily adapted to the requirements of the newer highspeed 
aircraft.4 Corey observed that trailer trucks were not con-
structed until after the war, and that it was not until 1950 
that one company offered a complete line of trucks on the 
market.5 Railroads began to make extensive use of the metal 
1. u.s. Department of Commerce Business and Defense Services 
Administration, Materials Survey: Aluminum (Washington, 
United States Government Pr1.nting Office, 1956), p. II-8. 
2. Ibid., p. II-12. -
3. Business Week, January 21, 1956, p. 80. 4. Maherials-sllrvey: Aluminum, p. VIII-11. 
5. E.R. Corey, The Development of Harkets f or New :rvraterials 
(Boston, Riverside Press, l95b), p. 36.--- ---
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in ·the designing of' new rolling stock after the war; by 
1956, all-aluminum passenger trains were in operation in 
the United Sta~es, United Kingdom, France, Germany and 
Spain.1 Automobile manufacturers increased their consump-
tion f'rom six pounds per car in 1947 to f'orty-f'ive pounds 
in 1957, and much of this increase is due to the use of 
aluminQm in fuel pumps and radiators rather than in orna-
2 
mental trimming. 
The metal has been introduced in other industries also. 
Aluminum foil packaging 1vas developed in 1948 and intro-
duced on the market in 1949; initially, the foil was in-
tended for large industrial purchasers, but since then has 
been also sold to consumers.3 Its use in mining equipment 
has resulted in an increase in European production.4 The 
lumber industry and breweries have introduced aluminam log-
ging sleds and beer barrels, respectively.5 Water and petro-
leum pipe lines and electrical and communications equipment 
are fabricated f'rom the metal also.6 
Government stockpiling policies hav_e accounted in 
large part f'or the high level of' demand f'or aluminum from 
1951 to 1955 when private demand was declining. Prior to 
1. Materials Survey: Aluminum, pp. VIII-12 f'f. 
2. Business Week, March 36, 1957, p. 192. 
3 • Corey, pp. lOl ff. 
4. Times Review of Industry, Nay, 1954, p. 26. 
5. Ibid., April, 1949, p. 59. 
6. Materials Survey: Aluminum, pp. VIII-15 f'f. 
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1951, aluminum production 1-vas unable to satisfy the rising 
demand for the metal in the private sector.1 From 1951 to 
1954, inclusive, demand in the private sector declined, and 
United States Government stockpiles, which were begun in 
1951, absorbed much of the surplus production. This state-
ment is confirmed by the facts that only eighty-six per 
cent of an authorized withdr§wal of ten thousand tons from 
the stockpile in 1951 actually occured, 2 and that the 1954 
recession was offset by increased deliveries to the stock-
pile.3 With t he upturn in business activity in 1955, the 
earlier downward trend in private demand for al~inum re-
versed itself, no longer requiring gover~ment support for 
the industry. In 1955, a United States Congressional Sub-
committee was told th~t private producers of aluminum pro-
ducts were competing with the Government for newly pro-
duced aluminum.4 Stockpile acquisitions were decreased by 
seventy-five thousand tons in 1955, existing orders for 
the alQminum stockpiles were extended to April, 1956, and 
no new orders were given. _!) 
Chart II {page 66) illustrates the effect of govern-
ment purchases of the metal upon production. T~e (from 
1947 to 1957) is shown on the horizontal ~ ~is, and the 
1. Ibid., p. VII-28. 
2. Ibid., p. VII-29. 
3. Ibid., p. VII-29. 
4. Business "lJ.Teek, May 28, 1955, p. 31. 
5. Haterials---si:irvey: Aluminum, p. VII-29. 
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logarithms of quantities produced are on the horizontal 
axis. From 1950 to 1954, production increased at a steady 
rate and stockpiles were enlar ged during this period. The 
1954 recession and cutbacks in stockpile orders explain the 
curvature from 1954 to 1957. The curve levels off in 1948-
1949 because of t he recession in 1949; with the recovery tram 
the recession, the introduction of new products, and defense 
and stockpile requirements, the curve rises steeply after 
1949. It was f elt t hat t he relative downturn in 1948-1949 
could have been offset by stockpile orders. 1 
Another major f actor in the high level of demand is the 
relationship of aluminum to oth er metals- especially copper 
and steel. A United Nations report attributed t h e large in-
crease in aluminum output partly to t he shortage of copp er, 2 
and the 1955 strike in t he copper indu stry was thought to 
be a factor in t he increased consumption of aluminum in 
that year.3 
Apart from shortages of copp er, t h e movements in 
copper prices may have inf luenced purchasers to shi f t to 
aluminum as a substitute. The f ollowing table (pag e 67) 
compares the changes in cop1] er prices and aluminum produc-
1. Ibid., p. VII-27. 
2. Interim Coordinating Committee f or International Commo-
dity Arrangements, Review of International Commodity 
Problems 1952 (New York, United Nations, 19$3), p. 11. 
3. Business Week , August 13, 1955, p. 32. 
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CHANGES IN COPPER PRICES AND ALUMINUM PRODUCTION 
Year 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
Source: 
Change in Change in 
Copper Price Aluminum Output 
($per sound) ( 1 000 metric tons) 
0.019 168 
0. 02&.4 (-) 16 
0.0200 167 
0.0300 289 
o.oooo 209 
o.o460 379 
0.0090 268 
0.0780 196 
0.0430 251 
0.1220 (-) 20 
United Nations Monthly Bulletin of 
Statistics. 
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tion from 1948 to 1957. One can argue tha t these f igures do 
indicate a positive substitution ef fect between copper and 
alu.minum • . Only in 195L~ and 1955 did increases in copper 
prices not result in relatively larger increases in alumi-
nu..rn production over the previous year. Noreover, 1-vi th t h e 
decline in copper prices in 1949 and 1957, the change in 
aluminum production was of a small magnitude. Th ese fi gures 
show, also, that copper is preferred to aluminu.m; when cop-
per prices declined or remained constant, the change in 
alu..minum production ~ras less than in the previous year. The 
Economist suggested t hat the decline in 1957 copper prices 
explained in part the decline in demand for alu.minum in the 
United Kingdom in that year;1 price theory suggests, of 
course, that all substitutes are to some extent inf erior 
to t he commodity that t h ey replace, and copper consu.~tion 
1. Economist, 183 (May 11, 1957), p. 518. 
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could therefore be expected to increase, given a favorable 
market. 
The demand for aluminum was also likely to be influ-
enced by market conditions with regard to steel. The Times 
Review of Industry suggested that aluminum complements 
(rather than substitutes for) steel; moreover, the Review 
implied that the position of steel was strong relative to 
aluminum for two reasons: (1) the steel industry's expan-
sion was due to the demand "••• for a basic engineering raw 
material", and (2) aluminum. output was approximately two 
per cent of steel production in 1957.1 The theoretical im-
portance of this matter lies in the fact that, if aluminum 
is complementary to steel, a rise in steel prices implies a 
decline in the demand for aluminum. 
The accampanyine charts (pages 70 and 71) trace the 
outputs of the two metals and the change in aluminum output 
compared with the change in steel prices; all of these 
movements are drawn in terms of logarithms and as a rune-
tion of time (from 1948 to 1957). Up to and including 1953, 
aluminum may have been a substitute for steel, and a com-
plement thereAfter. In Chart III (illustrating production), 
one notices that in 1950 aluminum output increased at a 
faster rate than that of steel, and steel output declined 
in 1952; moreover, the total curve for steel is generally 
1. Times Review of Industry, January, 1958, p. 57. 
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flat t er t han that f or aluminum. In 1955 and t hereafter, 
both curves are approximately parallel, indicating t hat the 
two metals are complementary. This analysis suggests, there-
fore, that either aluminum was a substitute for steel when 
the latter was in short supply, or that aluminum output was 
expanding to meet its own demand, while steel capacity was 
approximately adequate in relation to the demand for it. 
Chart IV is somewhat more conclusive in determining 
the relationship of aluminum to steel. Theory submits that 
a good is complementary if less of it is purchased when the 
price of t he commodity which it complements increases, and 
that a good is a substitute if more of it is purchased when 
t h e price of the other good increases. This proposition is 
based on the assumption t hat other factors influencing the 
quantity bought other than price remain constant. Up to 
1953, less alumin~~ was consumed when steel prices declined; 
after 1953, less aluminum was consumed when steel prices 
increased with the exception of 1956. On the assQmption 
previously stated, it would appear that aluminum was a sub-
stitute up to 1953 and a complement thereafter; if, on the 
other hand, aluminum output was expanding independently or 
steel production to meet the demand for it, then one might 
argue t hat aluminQm was never a substitute for steel. In 
any case, in 1957, aluminum did complement steel, and was, 
t herefore, dependent upon steel consumption. 
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III. World supply of aluminum. 
The supply of aluminum was below total demand (private 
plus gover~ment) from 1947 to 1957, and this fact is reflec-
ted in the upward price movement in that period; the de-
cline in the price in 1958 indicates a surplus of the metal. 
AL1JI11I1TUM 
Year 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
Sources: 
Price per pound (u.s. dollars) 
o.15o 
0.158 
0.170 
0.177 
0.190 
0.194 
0.209 
0.218 
0.237 
0.260 
0.275 
0.240 
U.N. Monthly Bul-
letin of Statistics; 
Business Week, Ap-
ril 5, 19~p. 36. 
In order to demonstrate that this movement of prices is an 
indication of the supply of a1u~inum relative to demand, 
and that it is not simply a random movement, Chart V (page 
73) has been prepared to illustrate the pattern of prices 
and production since 1900. 
The chart has been divided into five sections: (1) 1900-
1915, (2) 1915-1922, (3) 1922-1936, (4) 1936-1947, and 
(5) 1947-1958. In the first section, prices fluctuate wide-
ly and output expanded; it is significant to note, however, 
r 
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that production (beginning in 1908) increased more rapidly 
after prices rose. This movement and the fact that both 
prices and output levelled off in 1912 indicates a supply-
demand relationship. Similarly, in the second period which 
was marked by World War I, prices and production rose in 
response to the wartime demand for aluminum and thereafter 
fell rapidly. The supply-demand relationship is clearest in 
the third period; initially, both prices and output in-
creased, followed by rising production and falling prices 
from 1925 to 1929. With the Great Depression, the demand 
fell which is reflected in the decline in output, whereas 
price was more or less constant to 1933; as price began to 
fall in 1933, output increased. This pattern repeated itself 
from 1936 to 1942. \vorld Har II, as was to be expected, 
brought a great increase in output. In the final period, as 
has already been shown, total demand increased quite rapid-
ly. This statistical analysis supports the view that prices 
do respond to changes in supply and demand, and suggests 
that prices can be expected to decline if the demand for 
aluminum does not increase. 
The above analysis cannot assert with certainty t h at 
output after 1947 was the result of new capacity and not 
due to the utilization of excess capacity created during 
the war. Even though production in 1953 exceeded the war-
75. 
time peak of 1943, the fact that the chart is constructed 
in terms of output rather than investment prevents any de-
finitive conclusion to be put forth at this point. To ar-
rive at such a conclusion, it is necessary to discuss new 
investment separately. 
Between 1952 and 1953, the United Nations reported 
that United States production had increased by about thirty-
three and one-half per cent, Canada by ten per cent over 
1952, France by about six and one-half per cent, Norway by 
five per cent, Germany by six per cent, and Japan by seven 
per cent.1 In 1955, United States and Canadian capacity 
stood at one million, six hundred nine thousand, two hundred 
short tons and six hundred fifty thousand short tons, re-
sp ectively; planned expansion or construction in progress 
in 1955 amounted to over five hundred thousand tons and 
over three hundred thousand tons, respectively. 2 
Since 1955, a new source of supply resulted from the 
entrance of the Soviet Union onto the world market. Although 
quantitative data are lacking with respect to Soviet exports, 
a f ew observations are available with respect to United 
Kingdom imports f rom the Soviet Union; these observations 
are reproduced below. Although these data are of only a 
very short period of time to justify any definit@ conclusions, 
1. Review of International Connnodity Problems 1953, p. 12. 
2. Hetal Statistics 1956 (New York, American Metal Narket, 
1957)T p. 6oS. ----
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it is possible to say that the Soviet Union is in a compe-
titive position so long as it supplies aluminum at favorable 
prices; one notes that there was a large increase in im-
ports in 1957 with a decline in price. Moreover, the value 
of Soviet aluminum compares very well with an estimated 
value of United States aluminum; i.e., $514.81 (U.s.s.R.) 
as compared with $606.10 (U.s.). The importance of the fact 
that the United Kingdom is importing from the Soviet Union 
lies in the recent offer of the Russians to supply Britain 
v.ri th as much ingot as the latter wants "' ••• at 10% below 
the market price, whatever it is.•"1 
Of special significance to the Volta River Project is 
the fact that investments in the western hemisphere and in 
other parts of Africa are of more recent origin than the 
Volta scheme. 2 In the French Cameroons, the plant at Edea 
has been expanded to forty-five thousand tons.3 AlQ~inium 
Limited and its subsidiary in French Guinea, Les Bauxites 
du Midi, has undertaken a one hundred million pound invest-
ment to produce initially two hundred fifty thousand tons 
1. Business Week, April 5, 1958, p. 102. 
2. West Africa;-August 25, 1956, p. 643. 
3. Im., April 14, 1957, p. 170. 
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of bauxite and alumina.1 In addition, an independent pro-
ject under French, German, and Italian auspices has been 
contemplated in French Guinea; this scheme would process 
one hundred fifty thousand tons of bauxite each year. 2 Fi-
nally, Belgium has undertaken an investment of more than 
one billion pounds in a power station at Inga (near Matadi) 
in the Belgian Congo.3 . 
The expansion of capacity has been responsible for the 
increased output, which rose in response to the demand for 
aluminum. Demand has fallen since 1956, however. The reduc-
tion in government stockpiling orders not only implied the 
loss of a major source of sales, but also the creation of 
additional capacity for private producers; the Times Review 
of Industry reported that much of the planned expansion in 
1952 was based on expectations of greater defense spending.4 
That aluminum is mainly a producer's good and depends, 
therefore, upon the volume of sales of other commodities 
for its own sales places the metal in still another preca-
rious position; t h e fact that aluminum sales to automobile 
manufacturers did not decline in 1956 despite the decline 
in the sales of automobiles is in large part due to the in-
creased usage of the metal· in car manufacture.5 The relative 
1. Ibid., December 1, 1956, p. 979. 
2. Ibid., April 28, 1956, p. 222. 
3. Ibid., November , 23, 1957 p. 1116. 
4. Times Review of Industry, February, 1958, p. 84. 
5. Economic and SOcial Council Commission on International 
Commodity Trade, Recent Commodity Develo~ments- Memoran-
dum No. 9 (New York, United Nations, 195 ), p. 3. 
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decline in demand in some quarters and the absolute in-
crease in capactty have combined to effect a situation 
wh ere demand is less than supply; Business Week reported 
that there was in 1958 an excess capacity of one hundred 
f ifty t h ousand tons, which t hat journal estimated could be 
utilized only by lowering prices to stimulate demand~l 
IV. Sum..rnary. 
The Volta River Project was conceived of and studied in 
the context of a rising demand for alQrninQrn, the increase 
in demand being due to defense sp ending , construction acti-
vity, new uses for almninum, and new products. From 194 7 to 
1956, demand exceeded supply, in large part as a result of 
United Sta tes government stockp iling; prices rose and t h e 
outlook for new investment appeared favorable. 
To meet t h e rising demand, capacity was expanded 
throughout t h e world- in the Americas, Europe, and Africa. 
In addition to thi s new capacity, the entrance of the So-
viet Union onto t h e world mar k et contributed to t h e allevi-
ation of t he scarcity of t h e metal. That t he expansion of 
pr oduction enabled demand to be met caused prices to fall 
in 1958, in accordance with the traditional economic prin-
ciple of supply and demand. 
The prospects for t he Volta Project dep end directly 
1. Business Week, April 5, 1958, p. 36. 
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upon the ability of the market to absorb the aluminQm that 
would be produced in Ghana. One would expect that, barring 
an increase in demand, the increase in the world supply of 
aluminum as a result of production in Ghana would tend to 
depress prices. The Volta scheme cannot be assured of a 
favorable market, and nothing can be done by any of the 
participants to guarantee such a market, particularly since 
the demand for aluminum is derived from the demand for 
other products. Being subject to accelerator effects, alu-
minum sales can be expected to fluctuate severely. These 
variations in t h e aluminum market ought to have been con-
sidered by the Ghana Government, because Ghana's interest 
in t h e project was based l argely upon the desire to elimi-
na te the country's dependence upon a single export commo-
dity, cocoa- prices of which have also fluctuated severely. 
It is clear that aluminum production in Ghana would not 
guarantee economic stability to the countr~ and could con-
ceivably result in greater fluctuations. 
so. 
CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUDING RENARKS 
The preceding discussion of the Volta River Project 
has shmm. that the scheme was framed in a period -c.rhen the 
total demand for aluminum exceeded its supply, a time Hhen 
investment seemed favorable. The four years of study and 
the resulting report purported to consider all aspects of 
the scheme; the investigators looked into the engineering 
problems, monetary costs, and "human factors 11 influencing 
the project. In spite of the time expended and the optimis-
tic outlook of the Commission, the scheme was never carried 
beyond this planning stage, primarily because the estimated 
costs were thought to be too great. 
In 1...rhat sense were the costs burdensome? In vievr of 
the large expenditures on other aluminum producing projects, 
it is clear that the aluminum interests considered costs in 
relation to the expected returns from the Volta s'cheme; the 
evidence sug~ests that the alumi~um companies studied chan-
ges in the aluminQm market- even if the Commission did not. 
Had the aluminum market appeared in a more satisfactory 
light, the reluctance of the companies to invest might have 
been overcome. The fluctuations in sales and t h e accelerator 
effect of derived demand for aluminum accompanied by a large 
volume of investment did not lend themselves, however, to 
an optimistic appraisal of additional capacity. 
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The Ghana Government would have done well to have 
studied the characteristics of the aluminum market, in view 
of its avowed policy to eliminate the country's dependence 
upon cocoa. Such dependence was regarded as undesirable 
because of wide price fluctuations to which cocoa is sub-
ject on the world market. That Ghana was unlikely to achieve 
its objectives only added to the risk of its share of the 
investment in the project. 
Another problem, and one t hat was not carefully con-
sidered by the planners, is the relation of the scheme to 
other sectors of the economy. Tens of thousands of persons 
would be displaced from areas which are adequate for their 
needs ; the uprooted communities would be resettled in what 
appeared to be less desirable localities, despite t he Pre-
paratory Commission's conclusions to the contrary, which 
were, however, b a sed on an extremely vague and often incon-
sistent analysis. Apart from the ef fects on local areas, 
the migrant labor and cattle routes from the Northern Ter-
ritories would be altered owing to the widening of the ri-
ver crossings. 
What is the relationship of these findings to the 
issue of central planning? Theory suggests that factors of 
production are allocated by the planning ag ency without re-
gard to the pricing mechanism of the market; a necessary 
condition f or successf ul planning is the complete control 
82. 
of all factors of supply and demand. The kind of planning 
engag ed in by the Commission did not take into considera-
tion all factors of production; neither of the two aspects 
of the scheme discussed in this thesis were fully considered 
by the Commission. For the reasons cited above, the Pre-
paratory Commission did not and could not engage in central 
. . 
planning. Similarly, that the planners i gnored the influ-
ence of price f luctuations in the aluminum market indicates 
t hat t h e Volta River Project was not framed in accordance 
with sound economic principles. It is t he Commission's dis-
regard for the pricing mechanism in the aluminum market 
which exposes the scheme to possible f ailure. 
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1. 
The thesis, The Volta River Project, is a study o~ the 
proposed Volta River power and al~~inum project in Ghana 
with special reference to the problem o~ central economic 
planning in underdeveloped areas. The issue of central 
planning arises from the attempts of public or quasi-public 
agencies to allocate factors of production without recourse 
to the price mechanism of the competitive market. Because 
underdeveloped countries lack adequate capital resources 
to undertake large investments, they must seek funds in 
foreign capital markets; i~ foreign capital is made avail-
able in the form o~ loans, it follows that the profitabi-
lity of the investment would be calculated by the only ob-
jective standard of measurement- the p rice system. 
The Volta River Project is an example o~ a planned un-
dertaking by both public and private investors. On the one 
hand, the Ghana Government viewed the scheme as a means of 
diversifying the country's economy in order to reduce 
Ghana's dependence on one export commodity- cocoa, which is 
subject to wide price f luctuations; on the other hand, the 
alumin~m companies and the United Kingdom Government, who 
participated in the planning of the scheme, were motivated 
by anticipated profits and a new source of al~minum supply, 
and were influenced by the market conditions for the metal. 
Two carefully considered aspects of the project have 
2. 
been selected for analysis: (1) the consequences of the dam 
and reservoir (which would be constructed as part of the 
potr;rer station) on the economy of the areas subject to flood-
ing, and (2) the relationship of the project to the al~~i­
num market. These two aspects are significant, because they 
permit a study of the relationship of the scheme to other 
sectors of Ghana's economy- Hhich, in theory, could come 
under the control of a central planning body, and to the 
aluminum market- which lies beyond the control of any agen-
cy in Ghana. 
The planning agency of the project, the Preparatory 
Commission, recognized that the dam would cause many commu-
nities upstream to be displaced by the lake, and 1-IOUld alter 
f ishing and agricultural patterns downstream because of a 
stabilized rate of flow of the Volta River. Investigations 
were undertaken in both regions with the object of minimizing 
any adverse eff ects of the dam. The Commission recommended 
resettlement f or displaced communities in the area above 
the dam-site; as f or the downstream sector, the Commission 
suggested measures to take advantage of the stable rate of 
river flow on the basis of a caref ul analysis of the region. 
The prior assumption of the construction of the scheme 
prevented an analysis of the economic potential of the up-
stream area. The planners did not t herefore consider the 
3. 
fact that commercial activity appeared to be significant in 
sectors Hhere roads and ferries were available; one indica-
tor of t h e signif icance of this activity was the increasing 
population in many communities. Neither did the planners 
consider t he effect upon other sectors which, although not 
exposed to inundation, were tied economically to the threat-
ened region. Finally, the Commission's recommendations for 
resettlement were not based upon the availability of land 
of desireable quality. 
The relation of t h e Volta River Project to the alu~i-
num market is i mportant, because the scheme was coneef~ed of 
and studied in t h e context of a rising demand for alQminum. 
From 19L~7 to 1956, demand exceeded supply, in large part as 
a result of United States government stockpiling ; prices 
rose and the outlook for new investment app eared favorable. 
To meet t h e demand, capacity v1as expanded throughout 
t h e Horld. In addition, the Soviet Union entered the tvorld 
market, thus contributing to the alleviation of the scarcity 
. . 
of the metal. That the expansion of output caused prices to 
f all in 1958 was an indication that demand had been met. 
One would theref ore exp ect that, barring an increased demand 
for the metal, an increase in supply as a result of produc-
tion in Ghana would tend to depress prices. The Volta River 
Project cannot be assured of the favorable market upon whim 
depends for success, and nothing can be done by any of the 
participants to guarantee:' such a market, particularly since 
the demand for aluminum is derived from the demand for 
other products; being subject to accelerator effects, alu-
minum sales can be expected to fluctuate severely. 
How do these findings relate to the issue of central 
planning ? Theory suggests that factors of production are al-
located by the planning agency 1>1i thout regard to the p ricing 
mechanism of the market; a necessary condition f or success-
ful planning is the complete control of all factors of 
supply and demand. The kind of planning engaged in by the 
Commission did not take into consideration all factors of 
production; neither of the two aspects of the scheme consi-
dered were fully investigated. For these reasons, the Pre-
paratory Commission did not and could not engage in central 
·. 
planning. Similarly, that the planners ignored the influence 
of price f luctuations in the alumin~~ market indicates 
that the Volta River Project was not framed in accordance 
with sound economic principles. It is the Commission's 
disregard for the pricing mechanism in the aluminum market 
which exposes. the scheme to possible failure. 
